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3. Criminal Law <S>1006.1
STATE of Utah, Petitioner,
v.
Anne M. STIRBA, Judge, Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah, Respondent;
Laura M. Morrison, Intervenor.
No. 981383-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah. L
Dec. 24, 1998.
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4. Mandamus <£»4(4)
State was entitled to seek relief in nature of writ of mandamus from trial judge's
order limiting restitution in criminal case
because it lacked authority to take statutory
appeal from restitution order. U.C.A.1953,
77-18a-l(2); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(4).

5. Criminal Law <3=>1012
Mandamus <S=>3(7)
Z^
State commenced ^nginal proceeding^
Victims' right to pursue civil damages
(X— seeking extraordinary writ in nature of mandamus compelling the District Court, Salt against defendant did not provide State with
Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, J., to order plain, speedy and adequate remedy, so as to
additional restitution in criminal case in preclude State from seeking writ of mandawhich defendant had been convicted of theft mus relief from trial court's order in criminal
by receiving stolen property. The Court of case limiting amount of restitution. Rules
Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) State did not Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(4).
have right to appeal restitution order; (2)
6. Mandamus @=*28
State was eligible for extraordinary writ reWrit of mandamus relief is available to
lief because of lack of alternative remedy; (3)
judge did not breach her nondiscretionary direct exercise of discretionary action, but
statutory duty to order appropriate restitu- not to direct the trial court's exercise of
^
tion, and thus mandamus relief was not avail- judgment or discretion in particular way.
O n able on that basis; and (4) judge's error in Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(2)(B).
0
determining that defendant could not be re- 7. Criminal Law <3>1208.4(2)
~3~ quired to pay restitution to victim who has
Sentencing judge had nondiscretionary
been reimbursed by insurance did not qualify
2 /asas kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discre duty to order defendant to make appropriate
restitution. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(a)(i).
0 tion that could support issuance of writ.
8. Criminal Law ^1208.4(2)
0
Extraordinary writ denied.
Mandamus <5=»61
Judge did not breach her nondiscretionp
ary
statutory
duty to order appropriate resti3 1. Criminal Law <3=>1024(9)
tution, and thus did not provide ground for
State may not appeal orders of restitu- State to obtain mandamus relief on basis thkt
tion. U.C.A.1953, 77-18a-l(2).
she had failed to perform legally required
act, when she refused to include amounts
2. Criminal Law G=>1024(1)
previously paid by insurance in directing that
Statute setting forth specific judgments defendant compensate victims of car theft for
and orders from which the State may appeal their losses; "criteria and procedures" that
in criminal cases is restrictive rather than trial judge was required to follow in deterpermissive and, thus, the State has no right mining propriety and amount of restitution

f 5

P

State could not use writ of mandamus to
circumvent restriction against appealing orders of restitution, and thus was not entitled
to same scope of review available on statutory appeal. U.C.A.1953, 77-18a-l(2); Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(4).
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mphasis added); Indian Village Trading
ost, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah
t.App.1996) ("Thus, under Rule 65B[ ], a
etitioner may seek to . . . compel correction
f a public officer's gross abuse of discretion
inder] Utah R. Civ. P. 65Bf(d) ](2)(A).")
station omitted; emphasis added).
[10,11] In this case, Judge Stirba's rullg that "a defendant cannot be required to
»ay restitution . . . to a victim who has aleady been reimbursed by the victim's insurance carrier" was an incorrect interpretation
)f the restitution statute then in effect.4
lowever, a simple mistake of law does not
qualify as the kind of gross and flagrant
ibuse of discretion necessary for a Rule
55B(d)(2)(A) writ to issue.
• [12] Moreover, while courts may find an
abuse of discretion and issue a Rule
65B(d)(2)(A) writ in the face of .a particularly
egregious and momentous legal error, see,
e.g., Frederick 890 R2d at 1019-21, the
courts may not routinely use the writ as a
substitute for an appeal. See Merrihew v.
Salt Lake, County Planning and Zoning
Comm% 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).
The Legislature has exactingly limited the
judgments ,and orders from which the State
4. Judge Stirba based her ruling on this court's
holding in State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695
(Utah Ct.App.1997), that "an insurance company
is not a victim as defined in [the restitution
statute]" and therefore not entitled to restitution
payments. Id. at 699. However, the restitution
statute applicable when Judge Stirba entered her
ruling provided that "[f]or purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Section 77-38-2," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1997), which section defined
"victim" as
any natural person against whom the charged
crime or conduct is alleged to have been
perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or
minor personally or as a party to the offense or
conduct, or, in the discretion of the court,
against whom a related crime or act is alleged
to have been perpetrated or attempted.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(9)(a) (Supp.1997).
Acknowledging that "the result is troublesome,"
the Westerman court held that an insurance company does not fall within this definition of "victim." 945 P.2d at 699. However, the restitution
order challenged in Westerman was an order
mandating payment of restitution directly to the
• ^

-'-;_,„>*.
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at 6 9 6 .

may appeal in criminal cases, none of which - j ^ ^
include restitution orders. See Utah Code-j
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp.1998). Although J # - j
the State brings its Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) claim X ' £>
fen original action^) this proceeding has the ^ me characteristics, and seeks the same re- V
p
mr and
Qr\r\ vrelief,
o l i o f as
ao w
rmlrl a
a statutory
c t a + n f r v r v appeal
annpal ^
view
would
from Judge' Stirba's restitution order. r\ p
Hence, to avoid transforming this action into -<
an impermissible appeal, we must deny the J
State's request,for a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ ^
of mandamus.
>-

-r
o

i

CONCLUSION
0
Based on our determination that Judge -^
Stirba neither failed to perform a legally- v
required act under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) nor C 0
"abused
her
discretion) under
Rule ~$~
65B(d)(2)(A), coupled with our holding that ft £)
the State's action is tantamount to an imper- i^ ^J
missible appeal, the State's Petition for Ex- -r"~
traordinary Writ' is hereby denied.

p
9

RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge, and
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge, concur.
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victim. As we noted in State v. Haga, 954 P.2d
1284, 1289 (Utah Ct.App.1998), Westerman has
no application absent an order specifically requiring that the defendant pay restitution directly
to an insurance company. Accordingly, because Co K>
the restitution recipient in this case was to be the
very persons against whom the charged crime
was perpetrated, and not an insurer, Judge Stirba misapplied the Westerman holding in interpreting the restitution statute.
We also note that the Legislature has addressed the substantive issue in this case, i.e., the
propriety of restitution orders for amounts covered by a victim's insurance. Following the
0
Westerman ruling, the Legislature took the Wes- Co
terman court up on its suggestion to "enact remedial legislation," 945 P.2d at 695 n. 5, dealing
with any unintended effects of that decision. See
1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1. Hence, effective
May 4, 1998, the restitution statute defines "vic- -*->
tim" as "any person whom the court determines
has suffered pecuniar}' damages as a result of
the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) (Supp.1998). See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-20 !(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1998). Because this definition is far less restrictive than -i
Co
the definition considered in Westerman and certainly broad enough to include insurance compa-• ZZ
CU
*$ r\
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5. Criminal Law @=>260.3
Criminal defendant's right to an "appeal" from a court not of record is satisfied
by provision for a trial de novo in a court of
record Const. Art 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 7£5-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12); Judicial Administration Rule 4-608.-See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.
i

ivy?)
I) V I N I O N

'
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;:,^ ., H, Judge:

-

'! 1 • • Pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah
Rules; of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitioner Richard Dean asks this court for .an extraordinary writ ordering^ respondent, a
judge, of the Third District Court, to reinstate petitioner's appeal from a conviction in
Salt Lake County Justice Court. We grant
the petition.

r n m i i i u l L(,t¥t >'1!MU3

On appeal of a conviction from justices
court, the parties essentially get a fresh start
in the form of a trial de novo. U.C.A.1953,
78-5-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12);
Judicial Administration Rule 4-608.
riminal Law <3=>260.11(1)
court is not acting in a typical appellate
capacity; because the justice court is riot a
cburt of record, the "appeal" does not involve
a review of the justice court proceedings
which result in a judgment. U.C.A.1953, 785-120; Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 26(12); 'Judical' Administration Rule 4-608.
8. Criminal Law <S=>260.12
District court judge's attempt to remand
to justice court a case in which defendant
sought trial de novo was abuse of (Jiscretion.
U ; 6 J U 9 5 3 , 78-5-120; Rules Cja«x.Proc.,
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A); Judicial Administration
Rule 4-608(2)(E).

Joan C. Watt and Matthew G. Nielsen.
Salt Lake Legkl Defender Ass'n, Salt Lak«
City, for Petitioner.
Brent-Mii;Johnson,"Salt'' Lake City, :fV
Respondent;
Jan Graham , Atty.. Gen., and Norman E.
Plate, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
Amicus Curiae Utah Attorney General.

BACKGROUND
H 2 Following a bench trial in justice
court, Dean was convicted of shoplifting.
Dean appealed this conviction to the district
court, requesting a trial de novo as authorized by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 783-4(5) (Supp.1998) ("The district court has
appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de
novo of the judgments of the justice court
. . . /"); id. § 78-5-120 (Supp.1998) (providing "[a]ny person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court . . . is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court").
The district court case was assigned to respondent, who scheduled a pretrial conference. When Dean did not appear, respondent continued the pretrial conference to the
following month.
H3 The? next month, Dean again failed to
appear at the pretrial conference. Respondent properly issued a bench warrant for
Dean's arrest. * However, respondent went
on to dismiss the appeal and remand the case
to the justice court for further proceedings.
T)e$n then Tiled a motion to reinstate the
agpeal in the district court, which respondent
denied. . Dean now petitions this court to
* > rder respondent to. reinstate his appeal and
i > conduct the required trial de novo.
»*....
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This case is an original proceeding in this court challenging a judicial action
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Therefore, our scope of review is
limited and "shall not extend further than to
determine whether the resnondent has rAtm.

"

r

C i t e a s l & 5 P.Sd 256

13. Action &*63
If litigants ask for extraordinary writs
of prohibition and permit other rights to
expire, they do so at their peril.
PRATT, J., dissenting.

the assistant city attorney and the clerk
of the court to accompany both himself and
the petitioner to the courtroom. The judge
then took off his hat and coat, convened
the court, found the petitioner guilty of
contempt for having made the remark, and
imposed sentence.

[1] A reference to the applicable statutes and cases in respect to contempts and
procedure for punishing, if committed, will
suffice to dispose of this proceeding. Section 104—45—1, U.C.A., 1943, enumerates
acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The substance of the sections applicable
here are: (1) That disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
Alternative writ made permanent.
while holding the court tending to interrupt
Edward W. Clyde, of Salt Lake City, for the due course of trial or other judicial
plaintiff.
proceeding are contempts of the authority
Ira A. Huggins, of Ogden, for defend- of the court, and (2) Any other unlawful
ants.
interference with the process or proceedings of the court are likewise contemptuLATIMER, Justice.
ous acts.
Petitioner instituted original proceedThe facts of this proceeding do not bring
ings in this court to prohibit defendant the petitioner under the first quoted subJudge of the City Court of Ogden City, section. Admitting, if necessary, that petiUtah, from enforcing a certain judgment tioner's behavior was contemptuous or inholding petitioner in contempt of court and solent, it was expressed while the judge
sentencing him to a fine or term in jail.
and petitioner were either in the elevator
The facts out of which this controversy or just about to enter it. The judge was
arose are these: Petitioner had appeared not holding court, he had already adjournin the City Court of Ogden City to answer ed the morning session, he was on his way
a criminal charge of disturbing the peace. out of the building, and no trial or other
Defendant judge heard the matter, peti- judicial proceedings were ther\ in progress.
tioner was found guilty, and ordered to pay
[2] There is grave doubt that petitiona fine or in the alternative to serve a jail
er's
conduct was such as to constitute a
sentence. Petitioner then left the courthouse and about one-half hour later re- violation of the second provision of the
turned to the office of the city attorney to statute quoted herein. The rule announcpay the fine. He was directed to go to the ed by the Supreme Court of the United
office of the desk sergeant, which was lo- States and by this court is that criticism
cated on the ground floor of the same after final disposition of an action is the
building. The defendant judge had recess- exercise of the right of free speech and
ed court and was preparing to leave the therefore not contemptuous. See Bridges
building. The judge and petitioner arrived v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62
at the elevator shaft on the fifth floor of S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346;
the building about the same time, both Kirkham v. Sweetring, 108 Utah 397, 160
waiting for the elevator and as they P.2d 435. In view of our decision on the
stepped on, the petitioner made the fol- other aspect of this case, it is not necessary
lowing statement: "That is the worst ex- to comment on the contention that the beample of a Kangaroo Court I have ever havior of the petitioner went beyond the
seen." The judge overheard it, took the limits of criticism.
Section 104—45—3, U.C.A., 1943, propetitioner by the arm, escorted him to the
Original proceeding by James Robinson
against the City Court for the City of
Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and
J. Quill Nebeker, Judge thereof, to prohibit the judge from enforcing a certain
judgment holding the petitioner in contempt of court and sentencing him to a
fine or term in jail.

•v£G«~ ^ r
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TabB

fye Use of the Writ of Prohibition in the State
of Utah as a Means of Intermediary Review.
Justice James H. Wolfe
Of The Supreme Court i

Jhe role of the Writ of Prohibition
a procedure for intermediary review
kd & ^ r t k in necessity. Courts long
faVe recognized that inferior tribunals,
while proceeding strictly within proper
• r}sdictional limits, may nevertheless proceed so as erroneously to place one or both
parties in a position from which they can
not retrieve themselves. The damage done
^y be irreparable. A pronouncement by
ihe appellate court, correcting the error
$ay not result in undoing the damage. In
|896, the year the Constitution of Utah
became operative, 1 our Supreme Court
yd that article 8, sec. 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that an appeal shall lie "from all final judgments
of the district courts," was a limitation on
the power of the Supreme Court to entertain appeals. 2 Under this holding
it court had no power under the Constitution to entertain any appeal other
than from final judgments. This meant,
of course, that the prohibition against
allowing an appeal from other than final
judgments rested, not on <the immemorial
custom or policy of the common law
based on reasons of economy and orderliness of litigation, but on a constitutional inhibition. It meant that the legislature
could not provide for review in cases
where such review was not only highly
desirable from a stand point of economy
of time, effort and expense * but, as we
shall later see, in cases where it was
necessary in order to save a party from
the results of an action of the lower court
from which he could not be retrieved.
Na matter how palpable the injustice

I he State of

Utah

done oi how clearly erroneous the action
of the lower court appeared to be, the
Supreme Court was powerless on appeal
to grant relief until the procedure had
terminated in a final judgment. And this
meant that counsel sometimes had to
.peculate at their peril upon whether a
(udgment was final oi not—not always
an easy matter as witness the case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 9 3 Utah
426, 73 P . (2d) 1277. In the interlude
between grevious error and final judgment the aggrieved party could suffer injury, and an appeal to correct the holding
after the injury sought to be prevented
had already occurred mi^ht be a fruitless
victory.
This holding that the Supreme Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain appeals
except from final judgments obtained until
1937, when it was expressly overruled
in Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 9 3

Utah 426,73 P. (2d) 1277. It" is out
of this background that the writ of prohibition has evolved into a limited writ
of supervisory control and within certain
limits a remedy for intermediate review.
A t this time it is perhaps well to warn
the bar that in any case the writ of prohibition cannot be used as a means of arresting merely erroneous action except
under very limited conditions which we
shall soon consider.
The writ of prohibition is a ^ common
law writ of ancient origin. "It arose because a variety of courts came into being
whose separate spheres of jurisdiction
(1) Became operative January 4, 1896 by Presidential Proclamation. See Anderson v Tyree, 12

*re not always as clear and distinct
wnen on vjepLcmuci ^, J ^ ^ W , Llic
Congress of the United States enacted
might have been desired. If the writ
" A n act to Establish A Territorial Govis not first originated for the purpose
restricting the authority of the eccles- ernment for U t a h " known as the Organic
stical courts, it acquired its largest use Act, no mention was made of the writ
>r 'that purpose." s It is noted in
of prohibition. That act provided:
ollock and Maitland, History of Eng"That the judicial power of said ter>h Law. Vol. I, p. 129, that from the
ritory shall be vested in a Supremp Court,
iy of Henry II onward the royal court
District Court, Probate Court and in
as always ready to prohibit ecclesiastical
Justices of the Peace. . . The jurisdiction
tdges from entertaining certain cases.
of the several courts herein provided for,
aeon introduces his discussion of Proboth appellate and original, and that of
ibition as follows:
probate courts and of justices of the peace
"As all external jurisdiction, whether
shall be as limited by law: Provided,
:clesiastical c*r civil, is derived from the
' that. . . . the said Supreme Court and
rown, and the administration of justice
District courts respectively shall possess
committed to a great variety of courts,
chancery as well as common law jurisence it hath been the care of the crown,
diction. . . . and each of said District
lat these courts keep within the limits
Courts shall have and exercise the same
nd bounds of their several jurisdictions
jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
prescribed them by the laws and statutes
Constitution and laws of the United States
>f the realm. And for this purpose the
as is vested in the circuit and district courts
vrit of
prohibition
was
framed;
of the United States, . ." 5
vhich issues out of the superior courts of
The Act also expressly provided for the
:ommon law to restrain the inferior courts,
whether such courts be temporal, eccles- issuance of writs of habeas Corpus but
the other extraordinary writs of ceriastical, maritime, military, etc., upon
i suggestion that the cognizance of the tiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and
mandamus were not mentioned.
matter belongs not to such courts; and in
Section 4 of the Act vested the legis^ase they exceed their jurisdiction, the oflative
power of 'the Territory in the govficer who executes the sentence, and in
ernor and a legislative assembly. ^eC- jj
some cases the judges that give it, are
in such superior
courts
punishable, provided that the legislative power "sh»'
sometimes at the suit of the king, some- extend tot all rightful subjects of legislatimes at the suit of the party, sometimes jtion, consistent with the Constitution oj
at the suit of both, according to the na- the United States and the provisions J*
this Act." In Ferris v. Higley, 20 Wall.
ture of the case. . . .
375, 22 L. Ed. 383, in discussing «*
"The object of prohibition in general
eC
is, the preservation of the right of the power of the Legislature given by -> *
of the Act the United States Sup"**
king's crown and courts, and the ease
and quiet of the subjects. For it is the Court said:
wisdom and policy of the law, to sup" W e may, I think, assume, w * j £
pose both best preserved when every thing
much hazard, that defining ^e
J^f^f
runs in its right channel, according to the
tion of a probate court, or, indeed o ^
original jurisdiction of every court; for by
court, may be fairly included wlt^UL|j^I
the same reason that one court might be
general meaning of the phrase rig
allowed to encroach, another might; which
subject of legislation."
..
could produce nothing but confusion and
4
In 1870 the Legislative
^ * £
disorder in the administration of justice/'
provided for the issuance of writs
7
(3) Olson v. District Court, 1>0'6 Utah 220, 14T

. p and mandamus. 6 This new
rtment was before the court in Shep^ v. District Court, 1 Utah 340. The
J\jorJ was an original proceeding for a
3
•, of mandamus. The Territorial Su* mC 'Court, after noting that in 1874
f ntfess ^ a d enacted a statute giving
i |Jtah district courts "exclusive" ori• J iurisdiction in all suits or proceeded
i
i n i
? jp chancery, and all actions at law m
Jiicb &e s u m o r v a ^ u e °f ^ e thing in
ontrtf'Versy shall be three hundred dollars
Upwards, held that it had no original
wisdiction to issue mandamus. While
i e folding was later reversed it was in
effect a holding that the Legislative Assembly f° r tbe territory could not grant
to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
[o issue the extraordinary writ af manramUS except in the aid of its appellate
kisdiction. The same reasoning would
apply t 0 w r * t s °f prohibition and other
^aordinary writs.
"This reasoning was in part repudiated
n Maxwell v. Burton, 2 Utah 595. In
^oung v. Cannon, 2 Utah 560 the territorial Supreme Court held that it had
original jurisdiction under the territorial
Statute to issue the writ of certiorari. Both
of the latter decisions were approved in
People v. Spiers, 4 Utah 353, wherein
the court noted:
"The conclusion to be drawn from
these decisions is that whether this court
has, under the organic act, and subsequent acts of Congress, original jurisdiciicn or not to issue the writs of this class
is not material, as the legislature of the
territory has authority to give such jurisdiction, and had done so."
The fcower of the Legislative Assembly to authorize the issuance of the writ
of prohibition was thus expressly upheld.
The power was exercised in 1884. (L.
1884, Sec. 982 and 9 8 3 ) . The statute
enacted has remained throughout all subsequent compilations and codes, substan-

tially without change. It provided:
" T h e writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board o?r person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial when such proceedings are without or in excess of the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation,
board or person.
"It may be issued by any court except
probate or justices courts to an inferior
tribunal or to a corporation board, or person, in all cases when there is not a
plain speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. . . " 7
This statute was first examined by the
court in Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah
369, 10 P . 838. The case involved an
attempt by a justice of the peace to pass
upon questions involving the title to real
property, a subject matter over which he
had no jurisdiction. Before the writ issued the justice of the peace had decided the case. All that remained to be done
was to issue execution, which admittedly
was a ministerial act. The contention was
made that the writ of prohibition would
not issue to prohibit the doing of ministerial acts; that it, like the common law
writ, was limited to preventing the exercise of judicial function without jurisdiction. The court held to the contrary. It

said:
"The district courts have general commcn-law and chancery jurisdiction and
that covers about everything of a civil
or criminal nature not expressly committed
to some otherr tribunal: Ferris v. Higley,
20 Wall. 375. W e can readily see that
this general jurisdiction would embrace
the common-law writ of prohibition, and
that the legislature could in no? way deprive the district courts** of such jurisdiction. But the legislature, in pursuance of
its authority given by the organic act to
legislate upon all 'rightful subjects of
legislation/ has seen fit, and has the

doubted right, as occasions arise, to
sate new offenses, new subjects for jucial investigation, and new ways and
sans to enforce the authority of the
•urts and officers, and we can see no
ason to conclude that the giving of adtional power to the writ of prohibition
as not a 'rightful subject of legisla)n
The contention that the territorial legature had no authority to enlarge the
ope of the common law writ was thus
.pressly overruled.
State ex rel Robinson v. Durand, 36
ftah 9 3 , 104 P . 760, was the first
iportant case involving the writ of probition to be decided after the adoption
:
the Utah Constitution. Section 4, Ar~
cle 8 o<f the Constitution had expressly
ven the Supreme Court original jurisdicon to issue writs of prohibition together
r
ifch the other writs of mandamus, cerorari, quo warranto and habeas corpus.
hereafter the legislature enacted a stalte expressly providing for the use of the
Tit af prohibition to review the action of
istice's courts in refusing to dismiss proeedings shown by special appearance to
ave been commenced in the wrong preinct. The said statute obviously permittd the use of the writ purely as a writ of
eview. Even though the actions were
ommenced in the wrong precinct there
^as no lack or excess of jurisdiction.
^or was the remedy by appeal inade[uate. The court noted that it was unble to assent to the principle that the
egislature could thus enlarge the scope
>f the writ. Some doubt was expressed
is to whether the writ provided for in
he Constitution was the common law
vrit as distinguished from the writ as it
xisted in the territory immediately preeding the adoption of the Constitution.
however, the court refused to decide
he question because it held that both the
erritorial writ and the common law writ
equired that there be a lack or an exr r
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the ordinary course of the law* In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court
noted:
*'Whether the writ, as defined by the
territorial laws, should be regarded as the
writ of prohibition known to the common law, or as an enlargement of that
writ, need not now be determined. For,
whichever view, may be taken of the question, it is very manifest that the only office of the writ was to prevent usurption
of jurisdiction and to restrain acts in excess of or without jurisdiction, and not to
review proceedings and to correct error,
and that such an office was the only function which the territorial courts had ever
given it. If therefore it is considered that
the writ mentioned in the Constitution is
the writ as it existed under the laws of the
territory, with functions as declared by
the territorial courts, and is the writ as
we knew it, and as it was applied in the
territory when the Constitution was adopted, still the office of the writ, as defined
by the enactment, is clearly and unquestionably repugnant to the meaning oi the
writ. The legislation in question not only
enlarged the office of the writ, but completely changed its character and ^ converted it into a mere writ of review.
The statute was thus held to be unconstitutional and the power of legislature to
expand the scope of the writ was denied.
The question as to whether the Constitution refers to the writ as it existed w
the territory at the time the Constitution
was adopted or to the common law wn.>
was definitely set at rest in %[5 ft
v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 3 2 1 , 279 P. 8 ' *
The case involved an application ror
writ of prohibition to prevent the ^ ^
of Lehi from entering into a con* o
sales contract for the purchase or
tain electrical equipment. The obje ^
was made that since the act sought J>
enjoined was purely ministerial tne
af prohibition should not issue, the
v
1
mAni- kAi'na tkat the statute authoriz* *,^

ministerial in nature was unconstitutional,
because it attempted to extend the scope
t the writ. The court noted several
ses including Camron v. Kenfield, 5 7
£l 550, and Maurer v. Mitchell, 53
fal 289, in which the California Sureine Court had held that a similar proyjsjon in the California Constitution referred to the writ as it existed at the
common law. Under this holding a California statute (identical to the Utah territorial statute authorizing the issuance of
tbe writ) was held unconstitutional because it attempted to enlarge the scope
0f the common law writ to arrest the dojflg of acts purely ministerial in nature.
These California cases were distinguished by the Utah Court because California had never in its history before statehood permitted the issuance of a writ
broader in scope than that of the common law. There was no othei writ, except the common law writ, to which the
Constitution of California could have
referred.
The court further noted in Barnes v.
Lehi City, supra, that had the Utah Organic Act referred specifically to the writ
of prohibition, it might be argued that
by so specifying the writ, it was intended
to confine its functions to those only attending the common law writ. The court
concluded:
"We confidently believe that the
framers of the Constitution in conferring
authority upon the Supreme Court to issue the writ of prohibition, had in mind
a writ the character and functions of
which were the same as defined by the
statute of the territory which was then in
existence, and had been in existence for
11 years, and which had been recognized
and! approved by the courts of the territory, and thus, as was said by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in State
y. Ewert, 36 S. D. 622, 156 N. W . 90,
to take a forward step and to extend
the scope of the function of the writ of

The court then held that the writ would
properly issue to inferior boards, corporations or persons whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial.
The issuance of the writ to arrest the
performance of a purely ministerial act is
now apparently well established 8 as
is the holding that the writ specified in
the Constitution is the same writ as was
in existence in the territory at the time
the Constitution was adopted—which
writ was somewhat broader in scope than
the common law writ. Note however that
up to this time all of the cases gave lip
service to the principle laid down so emphatically in State v. Durand that the
Constitution froze into the writ of prohibition the requirement that it be issued
only to arrest proceedings without or in ^
excess of jurisdiction and that it issue r
only where there was no other remedy;
that any attempt to enlarge the scope of
the writ so as to eliminate these requirements would be unconstitutional. As already noted, it had been held as early
as 1 896 that the Constitution deprived the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain appeals except from final judgments.
9
Thus there was no mechanism for
intermediate review. Regardless of the
hardship, if the inferior court had jurisdiction to proceed, the injured litigant
must await a final judgment before proceedings could be had to review error. If
he were compelled to wait final judgment, the threatened injury sought to be
prevented would have occurred and the
litigant would have been placed in a
position from which he could never obtain relief even though he ultimately were
to prevail. The extraordinary writs like
(8) Cottrell v. Millard County Drain. Dist.,
5<8 Utah 37i5, 119 P. 166; Livingston v. Millard
County Drain. Dist. No. 3, 58 Utah 382, 199 P .
661 ; Moyle v. Board of 'Commissioners of Salt
Lake ounty, '53 Utah 352, 178 P. 918; Van
Orden v. Board of Education of Cache County
School Dist., 66 Utah 4(30, 191 P. 230; Booth v.
Midvale City, 55 Utah 220/184 P. 799; Hartley
v. State Road Coram., 53 Utah 589, 174 P. 639;
Olsen v. Merrill, 78 Utah 453, 5 P. 2d 266;
Washington County v. Tax Commission, 103 Utah
73, 183 P. 2d 564.

torari and prohibition could only be
to the decision. Consequently, that discistd where the lower tribunal was pro- sion embedded in the Atwood case was
dding without or in excess of jurisdic- not abstracted in the headnotes and the
i. Appeals could only be taken from
case must be read to discover it. However,
al judgments. And the Constitution
the case has been cited many times since
s construed to prohibit the enlargement in the opinions of our Supreme Court for
the scope of the writs and to prohibit
its conclusions in this regard.
It is
taking of appeals from anything ex- thought to have become a part of the
)t final judgments. The result was of
law of this jurisdiction.
irse inevitable. Lawyers sought means
It was noted that in most cases the
stay the harsh results of such hold- writ had not issued except where a lack of
s. The extraordinary writs were tried jurisdiction was shown. Yet:
4
m though there was no want of jurisIn a comparatively small number of
tion. Courts were inclined to ignore the r cases where the writ was granted, it was
e distinctions between jurisdiction and quite evident that the court was influor.
Likewise, when appeals were
enced by the fact that if it did not act
>ught from intermediate orders, the to prevent the threatened action by the
irts were inclined to consider the judg- lower court, irremediable. ha_rm would
nt to be final. The distinction be- have been .done. The lower courts either
*en jurisdictional and plain error and ignored the distinction between what was
ween judgments which were final and merely error and excess of power or, as
se which were not became confused,
in the Montana case in 56 Pacific Refact even had the line between final porter above cited, managed to see •&)
i non-final judgments not been so I erroneous ruling of the lower court as m
rred, it would have in some cases been > excess of jurisdiction, or else confused
remely difficult to know when one had the reasoning^so that it is difficult to deappealable judgment.
termine upon what ground the court aid
decide. In a still smaller number of cases
This state of affairs was analyzed in the line which separated the erroneous
wood v. Cox, 88 Utah 426, 55 P. action of a court in its legitimate judicial
377. In that case there was discussed
field from actions in a field in ex cesser
length the necessity of the court taking t its powers was so difficult to draw tnat
jnizance, on applications for prohibi- minds might go one way or the other m
i and certiorari, of errors where the drawing conclusions. . .
isequences of the erroneous ruling
"In a number o«f jurisdictions where a
uld otherwise be irremedial. The lack
'threatened interlocutory or intermediate
mechanism for timely review of such
order involving some affirmative actio
ngs was noted. It was frankly admitted
of the lower court in reference to propt this situation had led our Supreme
erty, status, relationship, or rights or parurt and those of practically all other
ties in respect to property was of such
isdictions to consider such rulings on
nature as to destroy the status quo an
ts of certiorari and prohibiiton where
render an appeal or other remedy ^
reality only error and not jurisdiction
fectual to undo the mischief, the'courts
s involved.
have issued the writ of prohibition &
'fill-in' in order to prevent the threa ^
Attention should be called to the fact
t in this case a majority of the court ened mischief most times not giving - ^
not affirmatively concur in the dis- sens therefor except to say categoric^ )
sion in that case distinguishing jurisdic- that the court below was thieatenmg
ial from plain error. While paying exceed its jurisdiction or judicial P°*v a,i
i-

i
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rn conclusion it was noted that the
<eS could not be reconciled so as to
I y down a definite rule of guidance, but:
<r

$/hat c a ^ k e s a id is that ordinarily
the superior court will look only to see
i the lower court was acting without oar
• excess of jurisdiction, and if so, wheththere is still not some adequate and
needy remedy, but that, in certain situations where it would work a palpable
injustice or hardship or cause damage
which could not be checked or remedied
jjj an y other way, the superior court will
BOt go too refinedly into the questions as
t0 -what constitutes error merely or lack
or excess of jurisdiction before issuing
the writ."
Some of the specific illustrations set out
in Atwood v, Cox as to when the courts
will and when they will not grant the writ
Suffice
inay better be discussed below.
it here to note that it was expressly recognized in the opinion in Atwood v.
Cox that the writ of prohibition could
under certain named circumstances be used
as a proceeding for an intermediate review
and that in so using the writ courts will
not go too 'refinedly into the question of
jurisdiction.
This is perhaps as good a point as any
to note that in some situations it is quite
difficult to determine whether a requirement is a condition to jurisdiction or
whether it is mandatory on the court
acting within jurisdiction or for that matter only directionary. Sometimes it may
make little difference in the result whether such distinction is made for as we
shall see in the matter of issuing a writ of
prohibition the controlling element is the
adequacy of a remedy by appeal. But
m cases of habeas corpus, it may be necessary definitely to determine the line
which bounds the area between jurisdictional error and error committed within
the exercise of correctly assumed jurisdiction. See Thompson v. Harris, 1 06 Utah
32. 144 P 2d 7 0 1 .

ing of the North Point Consol. Orr. Co.
v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., case, supra,
to the effect that appeals could, under the
Constitution, only be entertained from
final judgments. The hardships resulting
from the lack of some mechanism for am
intermediate review was again discussed.
The court, while still adhering to the ancient and salutary policy of the law
against piecemeal reviews, overruled the
North Point case in so far as it construed the Constitution as limiting the
jurisdiction of the Court to appeals from
only final judgments. The court said:
* ' . . . . we hold that section 9 of ar. tide 8 of the Constitution was a guaranty
and not a restriction on the right of the
litigant to appeal. Likewise, section 1 0441-1, R. S. Utah 1933, was intended
not to prevent this court from ever entertaining an appeal from other than what
is technically a final judgment, but was
meant to assure the right at all events
from final judgments. W e , however, adhere to the doctrine and policy of the
law, as stated by Mr. Justice Lamar in

.McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 S.
C t 1 18, 35 L. Ed. 8 9 3 , 'a case cannot
be brought to this court in fragments' and
that ordinarily a case will be dismissed
where the appeal is not from a final
judgment. . . we do not think a final judgment is a condition precedent to our jurisdiction, but is a condition precedent ex' cept in rare instances to our entertaining
the appeal because of the ancient policy
of the law based on sound principles/'
The situation which prompted the court
to entertain the appeal in the Pomeroy
case is considerably involved and would
be difficult to keep in mind if I should
attempt to state the situation there involved and perhaps not of sufficient moment though the Pomeroy case contains an
interesting decision as to what is an appealable (final) judgment which subject is related to the subject here being
considered. Furthermore it contains some
tests for the determination of an appeal-

Later the court again permitted an
appeal from an interlocutory judgment
granting a temporary injunction in the
case of Wellsville East Field Irr. Company v. Lindsa)' Land and Livestock Cq.
et al, 104 Utah 4 4 8 , 137 P . 2d 634.
In that case the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to prevent several defendants
from taking water for irrigation from a
particular source. After hearing the evidence the coairt entered its order, which
it denominated an interlocutory order, restraining the defendants from using the
water. The trial judge then ordered that
the case be turned over to the State Engineer for a general adjudication of the
water rights on the whole stream. The
result was that the defendants, some of
whom had used the water fear the past
40 years, were enjoined from using it
further. No final judgment was entered
from which they could appeal. The general adjudication procedure is time consumming and it might have taken upwards
of ten years to complete it. Meantime the
defendants under the order must let their
farms lie arid unless an appeal from the
interlocutory order was allowed. Defendants appealed and the court denied a
motion to dismiss based on the fact that
the judgment was not a final judgment.
These factors are not discussed in the
opinion in the Wellsville case. They are
however noted in a concurring opinion in
Watson v. District Court,
Utah
163 P . 2d. 322, which involved a writ
of prohibition on another phase of the
same case. In all probability appeals from
certain intermediary judgments in general
adjudication of river systems would be
permissible even without the authority of
the Pomeroy case. Such suits are of long
duration, take in many facts, contain
within the over arching suit many independent and local controversies which,
like probate procedure, in the very nature of the case require the opportunity
to appeal and which may be in themselves as between the parties concerned in
the local suit, final or at least have the

tion Co. v. Hooper Irrigation v^o. et al
87 Ut. 5 4 5 ; 51 P . (2d) 1069.
On February 15, 1946, in the case
of Graham v. Street—Utah—166 P,
(2d) 524 the court again entertained an
appeal from an interlocutory decree ordering an accounting between partners. The
court noted that the appeal was entertained under the authority of Attorney
General v. Pomeroy, supra.
It appears thus to be now firmly established that the court will, where the
facts warrant it, entertain an appeal from
an intermediate order. It also appears that
the writ of prohibition can be used as an
intermediate writ of review where facts
warrant it. The rule is thus stated in
Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114
P . 2d 2 1 3 :
" W e have held that even where there
is jurisdiction we will entertain the application for the writ if there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law. Atwood v. Cox, supra, we have also held
even where there is no jurisdiction but
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
at law, we will not entertain the writ.
Hense the important question is: Is there
an adequate remedy at law?
And Olson v. District Court, l©6
Utah 220, 147 P . 2d. 4 7 1 , where *
the court said:
"In addition to the purpose above
mentioned, the function of the writ ^
prohibition has been extended, under o
law, to cover situations where, e
though the lower tribunal has JunsaicWj^
the court deems it necessary and a
able to issue the writ to P revent g S u ° t j t
palpable and irremedial injustice,
is settled beyond dispute that if the^ 1°
court has jurisdiction, prohibition ^ ^ ^
a proper remedy if a remedy at a
adequate. It requires but a mome^ ^ f#
flection to reveal that for the rule
otherwise would make any ^ ^sUl
4J
r0
tentially a series of prohibition P

Whether the remedy available is adeiate, f° r ^- e m o s t Part> r e s t s *n ^ e s o u n c ^
J'scretion of the court. What is meant
, "discretion of the court" relative to
ijie issuance of prohibition discussed in
me detail in Broadbent v. Gibson, 1 05
jjjb 53, 140 P . 2d. 939. The court
jherasaid:
"'Discretion' does not mean happy
fortuitous choice, but a discretion guidj {>y circumstances surrounding the litination. If the term 'adequate remedy'
were an absolute, it might be incorrect
to say that we could ever grant the writ
Jiere there was another adequate remedy. But 'adequate remedy' is a matter
of degree and may run the gamut of situations at one end where he could not
retrieve himself, (Atwood v. Cox) to
situations on the other hand where not
to grant the' writ would leave the petitioner where there were no factors of
hardship other than those which attend
the ordinary judgment and appeal. In
between situations may arise where, in a
single case at bar, there appears to be a
remedy adequate in the ordinary course
of the law, but where there are urgent
public questions or question of public
policy involved directly or indirectly related or dependent upon the outcome, or
where the urgent rights of a large group
of the public await the resolution of the
question, or where a multiplicity of suits
threaten, or where some factors, either
intrinsic or extrinsic to the litigation, reveal the ordinary course of law really not
lie adequate although on the face of things
it may technically appear to be. In those
cases the writ may issue in the sound discretion of the court. Perhaps another way
of stating the proposition would be to say
that such circumstances involve a contradiction and actually defeat the adequacy of the remedy at law—render it
not so. In the last analysis, adequacy of
legal remedy may be under certain circumstances a matter for reasonable differences of opinion. In such cases if judg-

said to have issued in the sound discretion of the court, even though other minds
might have reasonably concluded that the
legal remedy was adequate. But 'sound
discretion' must always be labelled with
the precautionary admonition that the writ
is for extraordinary occasions and should
be sparingly used."
W e turn now to an examination of
same of the factors which control the issuance of the writ. First: it is clearly established that the mere delay and expense
of an ordinary appeal affords no grounds
for the issuance of the writ. This was
stated as follows in Construction Sec.

Co. v. Dist. Court, 85 Utah 346, 39 P.
2d 707:
"Where there is an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the writ is
not demandable as a matter of right, but
will issue only in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion. . . (citing cases). . .
T o justify a departure from the general
rule thus announced, some extraordinary
circumstances or extreme emergency or
necessity must appear, such that the court
ought, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to invoke this extraordinary remedy.
The mere necessary delay and expense of
an appeal Ordinarily furnish no sufficient
reasons for holding that the remedy
by appeal is not adequate or speedy. T o
hold otherwise is to hold that all appeals
are not adequate or speedy, for all involve some delay and expense'."
And in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra,
the court noted that "one of the risks
of all citizenry is that they must submit
to the law as it is declared until it is
repealed or found invalid even though it
entails some loss or inconvenience."
Second: the lower tribunal must have
its alleged excess of jurisdiction pointed
out to it and be given an opportunity to
rule thereon before application' is made
for a writ of prohibition. This is because
it will not be assumed in the superior

Derative v. Wiesley, 102 U t a h 6 0 1 ,
32 P . 2 d 3 8 4 , the writ was refused
fen though the court concluded that the
Jtah Labor Board had no jurisdiction
> proceed because no application was
rst made to the Bioard for relief. T h e
:>urt noted:
4

'If we were to proceed on the theory
lat the lower tribunal would commit.
rror when a petitioner properly demandd the protection of his rights, we would
e required to hold all remedies short of
3me action by this court to be inadequate.
. -. It should be a fundamental canon
f judicial conduct to avoid interference
nth administrative proceedings until it is
ertain that the proceedings which imlinently threaten to infringe the rights of
he petitioner will not be corrected by the
dministrative tribunal. Otherwise the
courts would be called upon to arrest the
>roceedings of such- tribunals by the use
)f an extraordinary writ even though the
necessity for the issuance thereof might
lave been obviated if a proper motion
o dismiss had been made before the said
ribunal. In fact, until the Board acts
otherwise, we will assume that it will act
:orrectly when and if a proper motion
o dismiss is m a d e . "
This was followed in Olson v. Dis:rict Court, supra, wherein the petitioner
failed to permit the lower court to rule on
the questions raised before applying for
the writ. See also Slate ex rel Welling

v.^Dist. Court, 87 Utah 416, 49 P. 2d
9 5 0 , where the court held that the trial
court should have been given an opportunity to rule upon the motion for a new trial
before the writ of prohibition would issue. A n d V a n Cott v. Turner, 8 8 U t a h
5 3 5 , 5 6 P . 2 d 16, wherein the court
said that " a writ of prohibition will lie
only in cases of manifest necessity and
after a fruitless application for relief to
the inferior tribunal/'
T h i r d : T h e failure to state a cause of
action in the pleading invoking lower

Cox, supra, where the court said:
" T h e court to which application for a
writ of prohibition is directed will not try
out the question of the sufficiency of a
complaint or information where the complaint or information states sufficient facts
to apprise the court in which the action
has been brought as to whether it has jurisdiction of the general subject-matter In
respect to which the pleadings seek to invoke its jurisdiction in the particular case
endeavored to be set forth by the pleadings. . . exceptions to this rule have been
made. ., . in criminal cases or in cases
where an accusation is filed to remove a
public officer from his office;. . .
However, in Furbreeders Agr. Coop.
v. Wiesley, supra, the court held that before a tribunal of limited jurisdiction the
pleading must aver the necessary jurisdictional facts and that if the jurisdictional
facts are not alleged, then the tribunal b$
no jurisdiction to proceed except to decide
that it has no jurisdiction.
It may be incidentally noted that a
petition for a writ of prohibition may j>e
treated as an application for an injunction
if it is filed originally with the distnc*
court. Broadbent v. Gibson, supra. Ab°
the writ of prohibition may be treated &
a writ of certiorari. Clark v. BrameU
U t a h 1 4 6 , 192 P . 11 1 1 . See also Hottm a n v . Lewis, 31 U t a h 1 79, 87 P. «^j
A n d a writ of certiorari may be trea^
as a writ of prohibition Thomas v*
Ct. 171 P . 2 d 6 6 7 . It thus a p p e a » »
the form of the application ^ r r elict^w
be generally disregarded and the pe
er may be awarded the relief to wta»
pleadings show that he is entitled s
^
as the application is filed in a cour
ing proper original jurisdiction.
Brief reference to the cases m
^
the writ issued serves to demojisbra ^ j ^ ^
type of hardship that is required, la ^ t f
ers v. Bronson, supra, the P e t l t I °j- n g^^
threatened with contempt procec i
^
, L _ I _ , _ i « c he appear**^ M ;

r aX Commission subpoena. Petitioner
*l Jflied that he was not required by lav/
appear. H e applied to the Supreme
r art f° r prohibition. The contention was
J"e that he had an adequate remedy
peal. The court held to the conap
' because in order to appeal he had
rs{ to refuse to purge himself of the
ntexnpt as ordered by the court, that is
refuse to appear before the commission
ke had been ordered to do by the
ourt If ^e w ere then held by the Sureme Court to have been wrong in his
efusal he would have been subject to
'mprisonment for contempt.
The court
fought that no man need run that risk
jji order to test his right to refuse to answer to what he considered to be an illegal order.
In Adolpll Coors Co. v. Liquor Control

Commission, 99 Utah 246, 105 P. 2d
|81, the defendant would have been required either indefinitely to comply with
an order of the Liquor Control Commission which he thought to be void or
jo disobey the order and thus hazard
,criminal prosecution and forfeiture oif his
license. Possibly he could have had recourse to the declaratory judgment procedure to test the validity of the order,
but this point was neither raised nor discussed.
In Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 4 7 1 ,
93 P. 920, the lower tribunal (a justice
of the peace) wras acting without jurisdiction. The Supreme Court noted that
in such cases it had a discretion to grant
the writ even though it appeared that
there was another adequate remedy. This
is, however, limited to cases where the
lower tribunal is proceeding without or
in excess of jurisdiction. The case involved a seizure of milk bottles from the
petitioner and an attempt by a justice's
court to determine title to the bottles under
an unconstitutional statute. The court noted that the case had a quasi-criminal aspect, and after noting an earlier Utah

court without jurisdiction, made the writ
permanent.
The criminal case referred to in Allen
v. Lindbeck, supra, is People v. Spiers,
4 Utah 385, 10 P . 609, 11 P . 509.
The petitioner there was being tried by
a justice's court for a crime over which
it had no,< jurisdiction. The defendant applied for a writ of prohibition which issued. The contention was made that the
writ should be dismissed because of the
remedy by appeal. The court said:
" T o compel a party to submit to being
forced through this tedious and harassing
routine of- illegal proceeding and usurped
jurisdiction is not only expensive and
troublesome, but also vexatious in the* exteme, and ought not to be allowed if it
can be prevented. If there be no remedy
by writ of prohibition in a misdemeanor
case, by reason of there being an appeal,
there is none in a felony case. . . A party
charged with any offense has the right
to have it investigated in a proper court,
and in a logical manner, and cannot be
compelled to submit to an illegal and unauthorized investigation. . . he is entitled
to have a judgment that he may plead
in any subsequent proceedings upon the
same charge. No citizen should be arrested and prosecuted before a court having no authority to hear, try, or determine
the case/'
In Home Owners' Loan Corporation
v. Logan City, 97 Utah .235, 92 P .
(2d) 346, upon a writ of mandamus it
was held that the remedy of paying a
sum of money under protest and a suit
to recover it was not an adequate remedy
to compel a municipal corporation to furnish domestic water to an inhabitant of
said city.
v
In Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, and
Washington County v. County Tax Com.
103 Utah 73, 133 P . (2d) 564, the
fact that the question presented had a
public interest phase concerning the rights

not the writ should issue.
3fy way of summary it would appear
) that if the lower tribunal is without
sdiction or is proceding in excess of
jurisdiction and there is no adequate
ledy, the writ should issue as a matter
right; (2) if the lower tribunal is
ceding without jurisdiction, but it aprs that there is an adequate remedy,
writ should generally not issue but the
rt is not entirely without discretion;
lien v. Lindbeck, supra, is an exam.) ( 3 ) If the lower tribunal has jurisfcion but it appears that by an erroneous
er it has placed one party in a posii where he will be irreparably injured
I that he has no adequate remedy to
vent the injury or retrieve his loss, then
court may in the exercise of its
nd discretion use the writ as a proce"e for intermediate review: (Atwood
Cox, supra; Meyers v. Bronson, supra,
examples) and (4) if there is no
nt or excess of jurisdiction and there
an adequate remedy, the writ should

never issue. (State v. Olson, supra, is
example.)
It thus appears that by the cases of
Atwood v. Cox, supra, and subsequent
cases based upon it, together with the
case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy,
supra, the Supreme Court is in position
to entertain an intermediary review either
through the instrumentality of the writ of
prohibition or by direct appeal from an
interlocutory ruling where the exigencies
of the situation demand it. But the court
will not in any case either grant the writ
nor entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order where the situation is such
as will abide the event of final judgment.
In those cases where there is both lack
or excess of jurisdiction and the element
of irretrievability the court grants the writ
or entertains an appeal. In other cases the
entertainment of the appeal before final
judgment or the issuance of the writ will
be in the discretion of the court, which
discretion will depend on factors dealing
with irretrievability, hazard and public
interest and importance.

In the development of our liberty, insistence upon procedural

regularity has

been a large factor."
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
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Article VIII, Section 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and
orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of
any cause.
No History for Constitution
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certifiedby a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
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4 - 8 0 3 . Trials de novo in small claims cases.
tablish uniform procedures governing trials de novo of small claims actions.
cability:
tile shall apply to the trial de novo of small claims actions.
mentoftheRule:
sneral provisions.
ight to trial de novo. Any party to a judgment in a small claims action may appeal the judgment in accordance with
on 78-6-10. The appeal shall be by trial de novo.
enue. The trial de novo of a justice court adjudication shall be heard in the district court location nearest to and in
ame county as the justice court from which the appeal is taken. The trial de novo from the small claims department
& district court shall be held at the same district court location. Either party may move for a change of venue under
pplicabie Rules of Civil Procedure.
mall claims appeals.
iling notice of appeal. Either party may appeal a smalt claims judgment by filing a notice of appeal in the court
ing the judgment within ten days of the notice of entry of the judgment.
Contents of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall designate the district court location in which the trial de
3 will be held, shall specify the parties in their original capacity, shall identify the party obtaining the trial de novo,
shall designate the judgment and the court from which theappeai is taken.
Service of notice of appeal. The appellant shall give notice of the filing of the notice of appeal by personally serving
lailing a copy to the counsel of record of each party to the judgment, or, if a party is not represented by counsel, then
lie party at his last known address. The appellant shall file proof of service or mailing with the district court
Fees. At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant must deposit into court issuing the judgment the fees
iblished under Utah Code Ann. Section 21-1-5 and Section 78-6-14. The payment of the filing fee is necessary for
ferring jurisdiction upon the district court. Payment of filing fees may be waived upon filing of an affidavit of
tecuniosity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 21-7-3.
Stay of judgment. A judgment is automatically stayed upon the filing of a notice of appeal with the court issuing the
gment and the posting of a supersedeas bond with the district court. The stay shall continue until the entry of the
gment or final order of the district court.
Procedures - Record of justice court. Within fen days of the filing of the notice of appeal in a justice court, the court
ill transmit to the district court the notice of appeal, the district court fees, a certified copy of the docket or register of
tons, and the original of all pleadings, notices, motions, orders, judgment, and other papers filed in the case.
I Orders governing trials de novo. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the district court shall issue all further orders
verning the trial de novo.
\ Disposition. The trial de novo shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of small claims actions. The
forcement, collection or satisfaction of a judgment shall be according to district court procedures. Upon the entry of
3 judgment or final order of the district court, the clerk of the district court shall transmit to the justice court which
ndered the original judgment notice of the manner of disposition of the case. Such notice shall be for informational
irposes only

(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood t h a t the applicant
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case
presents serious issues on the merits which should he the
subject of further litigation.
(f) Domestic relations cases. Nothing in this rule shall be
construed to limit the equitable powers of tht j court*- in
domestic relations cases.

legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall sts
plainly whether the respondent h a s restrained the pers
alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so 1
strained has been transferred to any other person, and if s
the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and tl
reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraj
shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon tl
petition based upon a dispositive motion.

R u l e B5B. E x t r a o r d i n a r y ivhef.

(b)(7) Temporary relief. If it appears t h a t the person allege
to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdictic
or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with tr
hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue a w a r r a i
directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before t h e court t
be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of th
petition, the court may place the person alleged to have bee
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may b
appropriate.
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respon
dent cannot be found, or if it appears t h a t a person other thai
the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be re
strained, the hearing order and any other process issued b;
t h e court may be served on the person having custody in th<
m a n n e r and with -the same effect as if t h a t person had beei
named as respondent in the action.
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone havinj
custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids service o
the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the persoi
from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately
a r r e s t the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwitl
bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt witl
according to law.
(b)(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event t h a t th<
court orders a hearing, the court shall h e a r the m a t t e r in i.
s u m m a r y fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. Th(
respondent or other person having custody shall appear witl
the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reason*
for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct th(
respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be re
strained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at th(
hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly
The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of forn
or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough if
stated to i m p a r t the meaning and intent of the proceeding tc
the respondent.
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public
authority.
\c)(l) Who may petition the court; security. The attornej
general may, and when directed to do so by the governor shall
petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this
p a r a g r a p h . Any person who is not required to be representee
by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened 03
one of the acts enumerated in s u b p a r a g r a p h (2) of this
p a r a g r a p h may petition the court under this p a r a g r a p h if (A
the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held b)
another or (B) if t h e attorney general fails to file a petitior
under this p a r a g r a p h after receiving notice of the person's
claim. A petition filed by a person other t h a n the attorne3
general under this p a r a g r a p h shall be brought in t h e n a m e 0:
the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by ar
undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any j u d g m e n t foi
costs and damages t h a t may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form foi
bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(c)(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted
(A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority o1
the state of Utah; (B) whom n nnM:« ^FR™- J

(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court
for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in
p a r a g r a p h (b) (involving wrongful r e s t r a i n t on personal liberty), p a r a g r a p h (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or
corporate authority) or p a r a g r a p h (d) (involving the wrongful
use of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority,
and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall
be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by
Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings
on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent t h a t this
rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on
petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the
procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(b)(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C,
this p a r a g r a p h shall govern all petitions claiming t h a t a
person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and
the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced
by filing a petition with the clerk of t h e court in the district in
which the petitioner is restrained or t h e respondent resides or
in which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition
shall contain a short, plain s t a t e m e n t of the facts on the basis
of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It
shall state the cause or pretense of t h e restraint, if known by
t h e petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the
r e s t r a i n t has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding
and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior
proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any
legal process available to the petitioner t h a t resulted in
restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
copy of the pleadings filed by t h e petitioner in any prior
proceeding t h a t adjudicated the legality of the restraint
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not
set forth a r g u m e n t or citations or discuss authorities in the
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum,
two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to the court t h a t the legality of the
restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding,
or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order
dismissing the claim, stating t h a t the claim is frivolous on its
face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not
state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be
sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal.
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed
as being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct t h e clerk of
the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
m e m o r a n d u m upon the respondent by mail. At the same time,
the court may issue an order directing the respondent to
answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a time
within which the respondent m u s t comply. If the circumstances require tho rnuH •"...., i
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i Upon full payment of the judgment including post-judgment costs and
•est, the prevailing party shall promptly file a Satisfaction of Judgment
m J) with the court.
» The court may enter a Satisfaction of Judgment at the request of a party
.* ten calendar days notice to all parties.
led effective November 1, 2001.)

le 12. Appeals.
) Either party may appeal a small claims judgment within ten business
3 (not counting weekends and holidays) of receipt of notice of entry of
pnent.
0 To appeal, the appealing party must file a Notice of Appeal (Form K) in
court issuing the judgment and mail a copy to each party. The appropriate
must accompany the Notice of Appeal.
:) On appeal, a new trial will be held ("trial de novo").
ded effective November 1, 2001.) legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated
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the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation
has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or
franchises.
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition,
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the
merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply
with duty; actions by board of pardons and parole.
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose
interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this
paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(d)(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted:
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or
failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory
law.
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition,
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the
merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in
accordance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings
are judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend
further than to determine whether the respondent has regu-
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON PANOS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
PTC/ MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No: 038300082 ST

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

RANDALL SKANCHY
March 17, 2 003

tawnil

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES
Video
Tape Number:
2003-017
Tape Count: 3:21

HEARING
This matter comes now before the court for pretrial on trial de
novo and for hearing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal.
The Court having heard argument from respective parties, denies
the motion to dismiss the appeal. Trial de novo is set for 4-8-03
at 9:00 am.
The parties are aware that this matter is double-set,
and they are to keep in contact with this court.
TRIAL DE NOVO is scheduled.
Date: 04/08/2003
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
TOOELE, UT 84074
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY

3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON PANOS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
TRIAL DE NOVO

vs.

Case No: 038300082 ST

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

RANDALL SKANCHY
April 8, 2003

tawnil

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS
Defendant(s): JENNIFER ANN CASTLE
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES
Video
Tape Number:
2003-022
Tape Count: 9:52

TRIAL
Mr. Panos argues motion for reconsideration re dismissal of
appeal. The Court, having heard argument from respective parties,
denies dismissing the appeal from justice court.
The trial de
novo is to proceed.
Mr. Panos proffers his testimony. He is sworn and questioned on
cross examination by Mr. Barnes.
Officer Jorge Chiclo and Jennifer Ann Castle testify on direct
examination by Mr. Barnes and cross examination by Mr. Panos.
Defendants exhibits #1-7 are received.
COUNT: 11:07
Mr. Panos and Mr. Barnes present closing argument.
COUNT: 11:22
The Court states findings on the record. The Court finds the
plaintiff has not met the burdon of proof, and finds no cause of
action in favor of the defendant. This matter is dismissed.
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